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INC. 1 (tender offeror) --- - .----., 
uK 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that section 14(e) of the 
Williams Act prohibits Lrttanipulative actlS' in connection with a 
tender offer, notwithstanding the absence of deception. 
~a - 1k CAb's ·sc"'"' ~s -J., b.... 
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2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petr tendered her 
shares of El Paso Gas Co. to Burlington Northern Inc. in connec-
tion with its hostile takeover attempt of El Paso Gas Co. This ----tender offer was for 25.1 million shares at $24 a share. Before 
the purchase of the tendered shares but after it became apparent 
that the tender offer would be successful, Burlington Northern 
Inc. and El Paso Gas Co. entered into negotiations. Burlington 
agreed to provide the management of El Paso with golden para-
chutes, and El Paso consented to the takeover attempt. Burling-
ton then rescinded the initial tender offer and instituted anoth-
er offer seeking 21 million shares at $24 a share. In addition, 
Burlington agreed to purchase 4 million shares directly from El 
Paso at the same price. Forty million shares were tendered in 
response to the second tender offer. Shareholders who had ten-
dered in response to the initial offer had to retender their 
shares, and were subject to proration. Burlington purchased 21 
million shares on a prorated bas is. Petr commenced this action 
alleging that Burlington violated section 14 (e) of the Williams 
Act by improperly terminating the initial tender offer and by 
failing to inform the shareholders of the golden parachutes 
granted to El Paso management. 1 
1section 14(e) of the Williams Act provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which thev are made, not misleading, or 
to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or 
practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or 
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of securities holders 
Footnote continued on next page. 
The D. Del. (Latchum, J.) held that Bur 1 ington' s rescission 
and institution of the second tender · offer did not violate sec-
tion 14(e), because the alleged manipulation did not involve any 
deception. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 18 5, 199 
(1976) (manipulation [for purposes of section lOb and rule lOb-5] 
is "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud 
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of 
securities"). Burlington fully disclosed its activities in 
withdrawing the initial offer and instituting a second offer to 
the shareholders and to the general public. The court reasoned 
that the fundamental purpose of the Williams Act is to promote 
disclosure. If disclosure has been complete, the fairness of the 
underlying transaction is of tangential concern to the statute. 
See Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (rule lOb-
5) • 
The D.Del. also rejected petr's contention that Burlington's 
failure to disclose the grant of golden parachutes to El Paso 
management violated section 14(e). The court questioned whether 
this disclosure was material within the meaning of the Williams 
Act; tender offerors need only disclose material facts. The 
court held that, even if the information was material, it was 
unrelated to any damage suffered by the petr. Petr's damages, if 
any, arose from the withdrawal of the initial offer; disclosure 
of the golden parachutes would have had no effect on the with-
in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or 
invitation." 
drawal of that offer. 
The CA3 affirmed. 
lation based on the 
It found tha~ petr's argument of manipu-
cancellat ion of the initial tender of fer 
sought to convert an arguable breach of contract claim into a 
violation of the Williams Act. The CA3 adopted the position of 
the CA2, which states that manipulation within the meaning of 
sect ion 14 (e) requires an element of misrepresentation. See, 
e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datalab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 
(CA2 1983), cert. denied, U.S. (1984). The CA3 reject-
ed the position taken by the CA6 in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil 
Co., 669 F.2d 366 (CA6 1981), in which the CA6 held that manipu-
lative activities included defensive strategies expressly de-
signed to artificially af feet normal market activity notwi th-
standing the absence of deception. Id., at 376-77. 
The CA3 agreed with the D.Del. that the nondisclosure of the 
golden parachutes involved deception, but that it was not causal-
ly related to petr's injuries. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that this Court should 
grant cert to resolve a split in the circuits. The CA6 in Mobil 
Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., supra, held that deception is not a 
requirement of section 14(e). The petr contends that the Ninth 
Circuit has also adopted this approach. See Pacific Realty Trust 
v. APC Investments, Inc., 685 F.2d 1083, 1086 (CA9 1982) ("There 
are instances when violations of this antifraud provision 
[§14(e)] are unrelated to the information supplied to the share-
holders.") (dictum). The CA2 has adopted the position that a sec-
tion 14(e) violation necessarily involves some element of decep-
tion. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden· Corp. , 717 F. 2d 7 57 (CA2 
1983), cert. denied, U.S. (1983); Data Probe Acquisi-
tion Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., supra. 
Petr argues that the CA6 's interpretation is the correct 
one. Petr purports to base her analysis on the language of the 
statute which uses the word "or," rather than "and," when refer-
ring to "fraudulent, deceptive, Q!:__rnanipula t i ve" practices. She 
rna in tains that two types of act ions are prohibited by sect ion 
14(e): deceptive ·practices and manipulative acts and practices. 
Petr contends that the legislative history of the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934 also supports her position. She maintains 
that the purpose of the Act is the protection of the public in-
vestor, and that this protection is not limited to practices in-
volving deception or nondisclosure. 
Petr asserts that the CA2 and the CA3 reached the opposite 
conclusion, because they erroneously relied upon cases interpret-
ing section lOb. She contends that section lOb is addressed to 
the problem of insuring informed investment decisions, but that 
section 14 (e) is addressed to the more specific problem of pro-
tecting investors in the context of a cash tender offer. Petr 
maintains that complete disclosure will not assist an investor 
faced with a cash tender offer if the tender offeror is free to 
affect the market through the use of manipulative practices, be-
cause the investor has nowhere to go with the inforrnat ion pos-
sessed. 
Resp contends that the decision of the CA3 is consistent 
with the decisions of this Court. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 456 
U.S. 624, 639 (1982) ("the [Williams] Act was designed to make 
the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair oppor-
tunity to make their decision"); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 
Inc., 430 u.s. 1, 31 (1977) (Williams Act designed "solely to get 
needed information to the investor"). Because disclosure is the 
goal of section 14(e), resp argues that omission or misstatement 
is an essential element of a violation of section 14(e). 
Resp maintains that the decision of the CA6 in Mobil Corp v. 
Marathon Oil Corp, supra, is an abberation and has been recog-
nized as such by other courts. See, ~' Buffalo Forge Co. v. 
Ogden Corp, supra; Data Probe Acquisition Corp v. Datatab, Inc., 
supra; Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (CA4 1983); Martin 
Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982). 
Alternatively, resp contends that the case at bar can be distin-
guished from Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp., supra. Resp 
characterizes Mobil Corp. as involving the use of an allegedly 
manipulative device whcih discouraged competitive bidding in Mar-
athon stock, but contends that the case at bar encouraged compet-
itive bidding by adding fifteen business days to the takeover 
process when it withdrew the initial offer and instituted a sec-
ond offer. Thus, resp contends that, even if the CA3 had adopted 
the approach of the CA6, this case would have been decided in the 
same way. The thrust of resp's argument is that there is no con-
flict in the circuits. 
4. DISCUSSION: This case is a possible grant. Neither 
the CA2 nor the CA3 made any attempf to distinguish Mobil Corp. 
v. Marathon Oil Corp., supra, when it reached a contrary result. 
Nor do I find resp's distinction persuasive. I would have to 
agree with the petr, therefore, that there is a split in the cir-
cuits on the question whether violations of section 14 (e) must 
involve an element of deception based on nondisclosure or on dis-
closure of incorrect information. 
Despite the conflict, however, this question may not be 
certworthy, because it appears that the CA6's approach has been 
largely discredited. The Court may want to wait to reach this 
issue when and if another circuit adopts the approach taken by 
the CA6. Although petr contends that the CA9 has done so, the 
relevant language, quoted supra, was dictum. See Pacific Realty 
Trust v. APC Investments, Inc., supra. Nor was the decision in 
that case consistent with the dictum; the CA9 enjoined a tender 
of fer until it could be determined whether adequate disclosure 
had been made. 
There is a response. 
August 10, 1984 Agrawal opn in petn 
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,U¥rtm.t atourt at t4t ,-uuta .itatt,G' 
Jla#lfiugtltlt, ~. at. 2ll~'!~ 
May 21, 1985 
No. 83-2129 Schreiber v. Burlington Northern 
Dear Chief, 
Please add at the end of the next draft of 
your opinion that I took no part in the consideration 
or decision of the above case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
jluprtmt OfO'Url (tf tltt Jtni~ .ftatts 
'~lhurlfhtghm. ~. Of. 2JJ~Jl.~ 
May 22, 1985 
Re: 83-2129 - Schreiber v. Burlington 
Northern, Inc. 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
..inprtmt <lJltllrlltf tlrt ~t~ ..ibdt.e 
.. ht.efrington. ~. <q. 2ll~~$ 
May 22, 1985 
Re: 83-2129 - Schreiber v. Burlington Northern , 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS 01" 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR . 
May 22, 1985 
No. 83-2129 
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
-
Please ;:v-Vl t~e onr1 of thP '1e'<t c1 raft 0f vour onin-
4on t~at I to0~ ~0 nar~ in the co~siA~r"tJon or ~ecisto~ of 
t:h'is C")"lE'. 
~incer:clv, 
The ~hief Juc;tfce 
]~n/ss 
.fnprtntt Of&mrt of tltt 'Jnittb .ftab• 
,ra..ftington. ~. Of. 21l?Jl.~ 
CHAM81!:RS OF" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
83-2129 -
May 22, 1985 
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IE:RS 01'"' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hvrtm.t ~onri gf tJrt ~b .. bttt • 
._-zulfington. ~. ~· 2Dbi"'' 
May 28, 1985 
Re: No. 83-2129, Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 




A\UFtm.t Qt&ntrllff tl{t ~b .itatte 
'llaeltinghtn. ~.Qt. 21l~JI.~ 
CHAM8ERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
May 29, 1985 
Re: No. 83-2129-Schreiber v. Burlington Northern 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
83-2129 Schreiber v. Burlington Northern (Annmarie) 
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CJ for the Court 1/18/85 
1st draft 5/21/85 
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